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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930567-CA 
v. : 
JAMES L. MILLER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for theft, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) , and vehicle 
burglary, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 (1990), both 
class A misdemeanors. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court clearly err by denying defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence when the State failed to articulate 
specific facts to support reasonable suspicion for that stop? 
A trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion to 
support an investigative stop is one of fact. This Court will 
not reverse that determination unless it is clearly erroneous. 
State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); State v. Svkes. 
840 P.2d 825, 826 and at 837-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (Utah 
App. 1992). But see State v. Munsen. 821 P.2d 13, 14-15 (Utah 
App. 1991) (applying nondeferential, "correction of error" 
standard in reversing trial court's reasonable suspicion 
determination), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). Compare 
State v. Rochell. 850 P.2d 480, 484-86 (Utah App. 1993) (Bench, 
J., concurring, joined by Jackson, J.) (arguing that Mendoza's 
standard of review has not been altered by State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)), with State v. Potter, 224 Utah Adv. Rep. 
19, 20 n.2 (Utah App. 1993) (stating that Thurman, "compels the 
adoption of a bifurcated approach where we review the ultimate 
determination of reasonable suspicion for error"). Factual 
findings are not clearly erroneous unless they are against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or this Court reaches a "definite 
and firm conviction" that the trial court was mistaken. State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
action. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with theft, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990); vehicle 
burglary, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-204 (1990); unlawful possession of burglary tools, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (1990) ; 
and criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1990) (R. 8-9). 
Defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized as a 
result of the alleged illegal stop of his car (R. 24-29) . After 
a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 77). 
Based on the denial of his suppression motion, 
defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to a reduced 
charge of theft and vehicle burglary, both class A misdemeanors 
(R. 86). The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss 
the remaining charges (R. 86). The trial court placed defendant 
on probation for one year, ordered defendant to pay a $1,000 
fine, a $100 recoupment fee and to pay restitution (R. 94). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
An anonymous citizen reported a "suspicious red 
vehicle" in the caller's neighborhood at approximately 3:00 a.m. 
(R. 56). A dispatcher reported this call to Officer Nunley of 
the West Jordan Police Department. Officer Nunley drove to the 
area, saw defendant driving a red vehicle, activated his overhead 
lights and stopped defendant's vehicle (R. 56-57, 60). 
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The officer did not observe defendant engage in any 
suspicious activity (R. 61-62), nor did he have any knowledge of 
any criminal activity in the area of the stop (R. 62). The State 
presented no other evidence concerning the initial stop (R. 56-
60) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State concedes the trial court clearly erred in 
finding the stop of defendant's car was not a seizure. Because 
the totality of the circumstances in this case is insufficient to 
support a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed, 
or was likely to be committed, defendant's seizure was improper. 
The evidence obtained as a result of that illegal seizure should 
have been suppressed. Accordingly, the State agrees with 
defendant that this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling 
and remand to the trial court to allow defendant to withdraw his 
guilty pleas. 
ARGUMENT 
PULLING OVER DEFENDANT'S CAR BY ACTIVATING 
OVERHEAD LIGHTS CONSTITUTED A SEIZURE OF 
DEFENDANT REQUIRING A REASONABLE SUSPICION OF 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
The trial court clearly erred in finding that the 
initial stop was not a seizure. Due to the improper nature of 
the seizure, the evidence obtained as a result of that seizure 
should have been suppressed. 
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A. Defendant Was Seized When the Officer 
Stopped Defendant's Car 
The trial court found defendant was not seized when 
Officer Nunley activated his overhead lights and stopped 
defendant's car. The court instead characterized it as merely an 
"informational" stop (R. 78-82). However, in Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 649 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held: 
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are 
implicated in this case because stopping an 
automobile and detaining its occupants 
constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of 
those Amendments, even though the purpose of 
the stop is limited and the resulting 
detention quite brief. 
Id. at 653. Accord State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 
1988); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990); State 
v. Roth, 827 P.2d 244, 257 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Lovearen, 
829 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Svkes. 840 P.2d 825, 
827 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Stricklinq, 844 P.2d 979, 982-83 
(Utah App. 1992)-1 
A traffic stop of this nature is distinctly different 
from a consensual police/citizen encounter. In a consensual 
encounter the citizen is free to leave or ignore the police 
officer's request for information. 
As long as the person to whom questions are 
put remains free to disregard the questions 
and walk away, there has been no intrusion 
xThe State's position is that while a vehicle stop seizes • 
the driver, that same stop does not necessarily seize other 
occupants in the car since those occupants may be free to leave. 
This issue is currently before the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of State v. Hiqqjns, 837 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1992), cert, granted. 
No. 920494, May 19, 1993 (unpublished order). 
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upon that person's liberty or privacy as 
would under the Constitution require some 
particularized and objective justification. 
United States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
The Utah Supreme Court, based on these two principles, 
adopted a three level analysis of police/citizens encounters: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has "an articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting 
United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 223, (5th Cir. 1984)). 
Based on this established precedent, defendant's 
seizure must be characterized as a level two stop requiring 
reasonable suspicion. 
B. Reasonable Suspicion Standard 
There is reasonable suspicion to justify an 
investigative stop if, from the facts apparent to the officer and 
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the officer would 
reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot. Terrv v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 667 
(Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). See 
also Roth, 827 P.2d at 257. This constitutional standard is 
codified in Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) : 
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A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
Accordingly, the reasonable suspicion standard is "less 
demanding" than probable cause, requiring only "%some minimal 
level of objective justification'" for the stop. United States 
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations and quotations 
omitted). Accord State v. Menke. 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 
1990) (reasonable suspicion "must be based on objective facts 
suggesting that the individual may be involved in criminal 
activity"). In evaluating the validity of a stop based on 
reasonable suspicion, a court must consider "'the totality of the 
circumstances -- the whole picture.1" Sokolow 490 U.S. at 8 
(quoting United States v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). See 
also Roth, 827 P.2d at 257. As Sokolow notes: 
"The process does not deal with hard 
certainties, but with probabilities. Long 
before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people 
formulated certain common-sense conclusions 
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders 
are permitted to do the same -- and so are 
law enforcement officers." 
Ibid, (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418). 
C. Defendant's Stop Was Improper 
To effect a valid stop of a vehicle, an officer must 
base the stop on, 
specific articulable facts, which, together 
with rational inferences drawn from them, 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
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defendant had committed or was about to 
commit a crime. 
Sykes, 840 P.2d at 827. 
This case is factually similar to State v. Swanicran, 
699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). In Swanigan, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed burglary convictions after one officer, responding to a 
burglary call, saw two men walking in the area who "stared" at 
the officer as he drove to the victims' home. Id. at 719. The 
officer reported this to another officer who two hours later 
stopped two men in the area. Id. The State conceded that the 
stop of the two men was not supported by reasonable suspicion and 
the court agreed; 
The officers had not observed the men engaged 
in any unlawful or suspicious activity. On 
the facts presented, the stop was based on a 
mere hunch rather than the constitutionally 
mandated "reasonable suspicion"; 
consequently, the confiscated evidence was 
erroneously admitted at trial. 
Id. at 719, see also State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) 
(stop based on lateness of hour, out-of-state license plates and 
rash of burglaries in area, insufficient to form reasonable 
suspicion). 
Here, the officer had no knowledge when he stopped 
defendant's car that defendant had committed or was about to 
commit a crime, nor did he know of any crimes committed in the 
area (R. 56/ 60-61) . Rather, the officer knew only that at 
approximately 3:00 a.m. dispatch received an anonymous report of 
a "suspicious" red car (R. 56, 60-62). 
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Defendant highlighted this lack of evidence at the 
suppression hearing: 
Q. Now, when the dispatch notified you over 
your radio that there was a suspicious red 
car --
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. -- did he tell you specifically what made 
this car suspicious? 
A. They didn't say what made it suspicious. 
In fact, somebody called--citizen called it 
into them. 
Q. So at the time you had no knowledge of 
any suspicious activity that this car was 
engaged in? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And then you say this car there was not 
engaged in any suspicious activity? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was there any further description given 
to you other than it was a red car with 
people in it? 
A. No, sir. That was it. 
Q. Now, at the time you initiated the stop, 
you had no knowledge that a specific crime 
had been committed, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you didn't see them commit a crime? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. At the time you initiated the stop, you 
had no idea of any specific crime that had 
been committed in the area, right? 
A. That's correct. 
(R. 61-62) . 
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The officer not only failed to articulate specific 
facts to support his stop, he affirmatively denied that he had 
any knowledge of criminal activity to support the stop. See 
Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("in justifying the 
particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion"). 
On the other hand, if the facts provided by the 
anonymous caller to the dispatcher had supported a finding of 
reasonable suspicion, the investigating officer's lack of 
subjective knowledge would not have been dispositive. As this 
Court stated in Roth, "because specific facts supported 
reasonable suspicion to prompt the dispatch, the arresting 
officer properly relied on the dispatch in executing the stop." 
Roth, 827 P.2d at 257; see also State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 
650-51 (Utah 1989) (stop properly based on objective reliance on 
police broadcast supported by reasonable suspicion). Here, 
however, the dispatcher did not testify and the details of the 
anonymous tip are not part of the record. Therefore, on this 
record, it is impossible to determine if the anonymous tip 
constituted reasonable suspicion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State agrees with defendant that this Court should 
reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress and 
remand to the trial court to allow defendant to withdraw his 
guilty pleas. 
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